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Reichenbach wrote his thesis Der Begriff der Wahrscheinlichkeit für die mathematische Darstellung der Wirklichkeit largely independently in 1914. It was accepted in March 1915 by Paul Hensel and Max Noether at the University of Erlangen. Unlike his later views, Reichenbach's thesis was deeply influenced by the Kantian view dominant in philosophy and epistemology at the time. Reichenbach had studied with Ernst Cassirer, Max Planck and David Hilbert, among others, in Berlin, Stuttgart, Munich and Göttingen.







Reichenbach's thesis sets out to give a detailed account of the concept of probability as it is used in the sciences and aims to tie this concept into the broader philosophical and epistemological context. Reichenbach intends to provide a purely objective account of the meaning of probability, a foundation for a rational expectation and conditions for the knowability of a probability claim.

Reichenbach sets his thesis against the background of the work of Johannes von Kries (1886) on the one hand and Carl Stumpf (1892) on the other. Kries’ view of probability is based on equi-probable events. The equi-probability of events is defined by a basic set of “ur-events”, which are all equally likely. These ur-events can be found by tracing back the (causal) history of events until no further reason can be found to make one event more likely than another. At this point the principle of insufficient reason can be applied to conclude that these events are equi-probable. That is, the principle of insufficient reason supports the inference from events for which there is no reason to believe one is more likely than the other, to the claim that these events are equi-probable. Based on the equi-probability of these ur-events, probabilities for composite events can be determined. It remains unclear what happens if there are conflicting states to determine ur-events (as in e.g. Bertrand’s paradox). In modern terminology Kries could be described as an objective Bayesian. He believes that probability is objective and that there is in some sense one correct objective probability for any event, but that ultimately, a human component enters into the determination of the reference for equi-probable events.

Reichenbach takes issue with the principle of insufficient reason since he views it as a subjective element in the determination of probabilities that is alien to the scientific use of probability. Consequently, Reichenbach saw his task as developing Kries' account of probability in such a way that there is no need for the principle of insufficient reason to determine equi-probability and that instead probability claims can be couched in a purely objective framework.

Both Kries' and Reichenbach's views contrast with that of Carl Stumpf. Stumpf has a purely subjectivist view of probability. He takes probability to represent degrees of belief. He does not present his view explicitly in terms of wagers, but it could be framed in those terms. Stumpf takes the realization that a die is biased to constitute a change in probability as opposed to a correction. He does not view the prior belief that all sides have equal probability as false. Instead, probability only constitutes a summary of the current knowledge an individual has about the events under consideration – and that can be updated. In that sense, knowledge of the equal probability of events is to Stumpf the same as equal lack of knowledge about the probability of events. 







Furthermore, the number of hits on white stripes is approximately equal to the number of hits on black stripes. That is, we find, no matter what the Riemann integrable function is, the ratio of hits on white to hits on black stripes is approximately equal. Reichenbach thereby shows that it is not the equi-probability of the ur-events that is required to make sense of probability claims, but rather the existence of the convergence limit of the empirical frequency distribution to a continuous function. In particular, if the black stripes were twice as wide as the white ones, we would have a strike ratio of 2:1, i.e. not equal, but we could still speak of a probability distribution, as long as the empirical distribution converges to a continuous function. With the argument based on strike ratios Reichenbach replaces the principle of insufficient reason with an assumption about the existence of a convergence limit.​[2]​

Consequently, his next task is to determine which conditions are necessary in order to ensure the existence of a convergence limit of the empirical distribution. Reichenbach identifies causally independent and causally identical trials as two such conditions.  He then attempts to show that causally independent and causally identical trials imply probabilistically independent and identically distributed trials. This would – although Reichenbach never explicitly states it that way – provide a foundation for the weak law of large numbers, i.e. convergence in probability. Reichenbach does not provide a proof of the inference, but he does hint at an argument based on the invariance of distribution under intervention. He claims that the marginal distribution of one variable is invariant under intervention on a causally unconnected variable.​[3]​ In order to complete the proof, Reichenbach would need something similar to the causal Markov assumption, first mentioned by Kiiveri and Speed (1982) that would connect the causal structure to the probability distribution. In his thesis, he only appeals to the intuition provided by his argument.

Even though causally independent and identically distributed trials would give Reichenbach the conditions for the application of the weak law of large numbers, he does not refer to it here or discuss its relevance. One interpretation is that the weak law of large numbers only guarantees convergence in probability. Since probability is something he wants to define, convergence in probability would imply a circular foundation. Instead, Reichenbach attempts to make a claim that guarantees convergence with certainty. 

In retrospect it might be obvious that search for a certain convergence guarantee is a non-starter. Later in his career, Reichenbach takes several different approaches to address this problem. He develops ideas of higher-order probabilities that guarantee convergence (in higher-order probability) and argues for what comes to be known as the straight rule, where belief in the convergence is taken to be the best bet we have in finding the truth, even if no guarantee of convergence is provided. 

In his thesis, however, Reichenbach takes an entirely different approach. Reichenbach argues that the assumption of a convergence limit of the empirical frequency distribution is guaranteed by a synthetic a priori principle: the principle of lawful distribution. The argument for the synthetic a priori status of this principle is, in short, as follows. It is a transcendental argument in the spirit of Kant's argument for the synthetic a priori principle of causality.​[4]​

Reichenbach claims that our scientific knowledge is represented in the laws of nature. These laws, or at least some of them, are causal laws. In his view at the time, causal relations were assumed to be relations between individual token events, not between types of events – entirely in line with Kant's view of causality (or at least one of its interpretations). Hence, if our causal knowledge is restricted to token events, then in order to attain knowledge in terms of causal laws, one needs some aggregating mechanism that aggregates token causal events into scientific laws. This aggregation procedure is provided by the laws of probability.​[5]​ We only ever have finitely many token causal events to aggregate. If we had no guarantee that the empirical frequency distribution of these finitely many token causal events converges, then we could not have the knowledge represented in the laws of nature. But we do have this knowledge, and hence we must have a guarantee of convergence. Hence, the principle of lawful distribution is a necessary ingredient for the attainment of knowledge; it is a synthetic a priori principle that complements Kant's principle of causality.

Reichenbach thus provides an entirely objective account of probability. It is not circular, since it is based on causal independence and causally identical trials. It does not rely on the principle of insufficient reason, since that is replaced by an analysis of strike ratios and the assumption of a convergence limit of the empirical frequency distribution. The limit is guaranteed by the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution, for which he provides a transcendental deduction. Furthermore, he claims this account provides the foundation for a rational expectation. Reichenbach argues that a rational expectation may be based on an inference that takes the empirical frequency distribution to be the true probability distribution: It is true that the empirical distribution may diverge again before it converges, but the guaranteed existence of some (unknown) finite point at which convergence occurs is sufficient to support such an expectation.​[6]​

Reichenbach claims that if convergence does not occur, then one has an indication that the conditions (causal independence of trials, causally identical trials) have not been satisfied. However, such lack of convergence does not refute the principle of lawful distribution. He admits that his argument implies that the principle of lawful distribution is untestable, but he points out that the same criticism applies to Kant, whose principle of causality also fails to be testable – that is the nature of synthetic a priori principles.​[7]​


3. Analysis of Thesis

The story may not be quite as rosy. Reichenbach does successfully dismiss accounts of equi-probability based on symmetry considerations, and thereby avoids the obvious paradoxes of the choice of the geometrical reference classes for the assignment of equal probabilities (e.g. Bertrand's paradox). And it is true that Reichenbach addresses the subjective element due to the principle of insufficient reason in Kries' account and replaces it with a different assumption. While the end product might now seem like a more objective theoretical account for the foundations of probability, it seems like one cannot dispense with the principle of insufficient reason entirely. Reichenbach does not provide any guidance on how trials, that form the basis of his account of probability, are supposed to be judged (i) causally independent, and (ii) causally identical. It seems that while the principle of insufficient reason may no longer be needed to judge the equi-probability of events, it seems essential to determining causal independence.

But even if this could be accounted for, Reichenbach provides no proof of how causal independence and causally identical trials imply probabilistically independent and identically distributed trials. For the step from identical causes to an identical distribution Reichenbach only provides the claim that repeated trials must be of the “same” process. Two processes are the same if they differ only in their position in space and time and all physically measurable variables have the same value. There are two interpretations of this statement. The first is that causes just amount to probabilistic features in the population and hence trials with identical causes just are those with identical distributions. This would not be an interpretation in the spirit of the thesis, since causal relations are taken to be token relations and therefore related to but distinct from probabilistic relations. Furthermore, this would imply that his account of probability is circular (or tautological) since we would have an identity between trials with identical causes and identically distributed trials. The second interpretation, which I suggested above, is that identical distribution follows from identical causes. But in this case Reichenbach has provided no proof.

For the step from causally independent trials to probabilistically independent trials a similar analysis applies: If one knows one has causally independent trials, then Reichenbach needs to show how causally independent trials lead to probabilistic independence. Reichenbach does not provide the derivation, but he does indicate (without proof) that causal independence goes together with an invariance of the marginal distribution of one variable under interventions on other variables, which in turn allows for the factorization of the joint probability. But the argument is opaque.

There is a further concern that even if the steps in his argument were filled with proofs, that the conditions he lays out are too strong: One might quite sensibly argue that a sequence of trials can exhibit a certain probability of an event type, even if the trials are not completely independent or entirely causally similar. For example, repeated flips of the exact same coin might exhibit a probability of 1/2 of heads, even though the trials in the sequence are not causally similar, since the coin measurably wears down.​[8]​ The point is that it is doubtful whether there are many examples in real life that satisfy his conditions. As an aside, in The Theory of Probability Reichenbach does generalize his notion of independent trials to sequences of trials that are normal. The class of normal sequences is more general than that of sequences of independent trials (or random sequences), but excludes deterministic or patterned sequences.

With regard to this first aim of an objective account of probability, there is one more serious epistemological concern: The way the argument is laid out, Reichenbach provides a reduction of probabilistic relations to causal relations (plus a few assumptions). If the principle of insufficient reason is not to play any role at the foundations, then causal independence would have to be taken as a primitive. This would seem like a rather strong assumption.  The question that remains regarding the first aim of his thesis is whether Reichenbach really gave an objective foundation for probability or whether he gave a more detailed analysis of the principle of insufficient reason. The concern is that reducing probability concepts to causal concepts seems to be defining something simple in terms of something more complicated or at least equally undefined and epistemically intractable.

Reichenbach's second aim was to give an account of rational expectation that provides a normative account for the choice of an action based on the true probability of the occurrence of events. In order to do so, he needed to provide a semantic analysis of probability claims and explain how we could obtain any knowledge about such claims. This goes hand in hand with the integration of his work into a general epistemological framework.

The results of this second part of his investigation are unsatisfying. Reichenbach unfortunately succumbs to the strong influence of the Kantian philosophy, which seems to have prevented him from presenting interesting results. He essentially claims that we must assume that the strike ratios of the process under consideration will converge, since otherwise the knowledge represented in the laws of science would be impossible to attain. Reichenbach refers to the weak law of large numbers, but does not lay out its relevance to the problem he is trying to tackle, nor does he discuss why it would be inadequate. Instead, he argues that a guarantee of convergence can be given with certainty. But the claim is – even if one believes the transcendental deduction – extremely weak and practically useless: Convergence is guaranteed at some point after some finite number of trials, but the actual point is unknown. This claim makes no headway into the actual question of how we are supposed to interpret the empirical distribution after a finite number of trials, what it tells us about future events or future distributions and how we could verify or falsify any probability claim. Furthermore, it seems like an extremely weak support for the basis of a rational expectation: Use the empirical distribution as basis for inferences because at some point the empirical distribution converges to the true distribution. No measure of confidence in the empirical distribution or measure of distance between the empirical and true distribution is provided.

A synthetic a priori assurance that the empirical distribution of a finite number of trials converges at some point begs the question of what assurance we have regarding probability claims based on empirical facts. Reichenbach does not deny this and admits that there is no way to disprove the principle of lawful distribution. But rather than admitting that he has provided an unsatisfactory argument, he argues that Kant's argument for the principle of causality was no better. Sadly, reference to a poor argument of a greater authority does not make the present argument any better. 

As a result, we are left with a technical account of a (well, let's say) objective foundation of probability (strike ratios approximating a continuous function), but with no satisfactory meaning to our probability claims, as the convergence guarantee is bogus. As a result we have no adequate account of the conditions for the ascertability of probability claims.






In unpublished autobiographical notes from August 6, 1927, Reichenbach gives a brief review of the main results of his thesis. He lists the following​[10]​:  

(i)	The assumption of equi-probable events can be replaced by a continuity assumption. 
(ii)	The continuity assumption is essential to an understanding of causal claims. 
(iii)	An attempt to provide a guarantee of certain convergence.  
(iv)	An attempt to show that the principle of lawful distribution is a synthetic a priori principle and necessary for all knowledge.

In 1927 Reichenbach views points (iii) and (iv) as failures. His work in The Theory of Relativity and a priori Knowledge (1920/1965), resulting from the lectures Reichenbach attended with Einstein after his doctoral thesis, convinced him of the impossibility of synthetic a priori principles. On (iii) he concedes that one can only guarantee convergence in probability (as is the case with the weak law of large numbers), rather than convergence with certainty. However, he considers the link between probability and causality (ii) to be one of the most important discoveries since Hume. 
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^1	  See, for example Michael Strevens, Bigger than Chaos, (2003).
^2	  Thesis, pages 21-26.
^3	  Thesis, pages 33-36.
^4	  Thesis, chapter 3.
^5	  Anyone familiar with the material will recognize the similarity to D. Rubins view of causality here.
^6	  Thesis, pages 70-72.
^7	  Thesis, page 71.
^8	  Thanks to Teddy Seidenfeld for this example.
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